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Testimony by the Governor before the Parliamentary Budget Committee in relation to 
the draft State Budget for 2011
I appear before this Committee in connection with Parliament’s discussion of the State 
Budget for 2011. In my view, this Budget will be crucial for Spain’s economic future and 
it will be subject, more than on any other occasion, to in-depth analysis and close scru-
tiny not only by Spanish society as a whole but also by the main supranational agencies, 
by our European partners and by the international financial markets on which Spanish 
households, firms and governments obtain the funds they need to finance much of their 
activity. 
As is known, Spanish budgetary policy responded most forcefully to the global economic and 
fi nancial crisis, in step with the support programmes for the fi nancial sector, coordinated at 
European level, and with the fi rm, resolute action by the European Central Bank, which dras-
tically cut its interest rates and implemented a wide range of conventional and non-conven-
tional measures to prevent liquidity tensions from ultimately shutting down the European fi -
nancial system. 
The fi scal policy response undoubtedly contributed to softening the adverse effects of the 
crisis on the Spanish economy. Set against this, however, the surplus on public fi nances rap-
idly turned into a burgeoning defi cit and public debt moved into an accelerating dynamic 
which, had it not departed from relatively comfortable levels, would have also placed the debt 
ratio at excessively high levels. 
Such was the position of our public fi nances when the Greek fi scal crisis broke, leading inves-
tors to rapidly take stock of the potential problems of unsustainability implicit in Greek defi cit 
and debt dynamics and to begin to closely examine the possible existence of similar risks in 
other Member States. The upshot was that the instability on sovereign risk markets spread to 
the European economies evidencing the greatest vulnerabilities, whether because of the speed 
of the recent deterioration in their public fi nances or because of the scale of the macroeco-
nomic imbalances that had built up before the crisis.
True, the fi nancial tensions in recent months in Europe, in general, and in our country, in par-
ticular, were largely due to an overreaction by the fi nancial markets, which were unable to 
appreciate the strengths of our economy and of our public fi nances. 
But it would be a serious error to attribute the bouts of exceptional tension witnessed during 
these months solely to the gregarious behaviour of the fi nancial markets. Indeed, the tensions 
were amplifi ed by the weaknesses of European institutional arrangements and by the prevail-
ing doubts over the willingness and ability of national governments to tackle the structural and 
budget defi cit problems of their economies. 
Evidently, the Greek crisis highlighted the incapacity of the Stability and Growth Pact and, 
more generally, of the European economic governance framework to prevent the excessive 
build-up of imbalances and to pursue timely corrective action. As you know, the European 
authorities have reacted to this need by initiating a deep-seated review of European govern-
ance mechanisms, some of the results of which are already coming to light. It can thus be 
said that as a result of this crisis, economic policies and, in particular, the fi scal policy of the 
EU Member States, will be subject henceforth to closer and more detailed control by the 
European institutions so as to anticipate and forestall inconsistencies and imbalances. Any 
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build-up of the latter will ultimately entail major costs not only for the countries concerned, 
but also for the European single currency project.  
Further, attributing events exclusively to market excesses would mean ignoring the importance 
of the effects of the decline in activity and employment, of the deterioration in public fi nances 
and of fi nancial systems on the possibilities of recovery, and the major economic policy chal-
lenges posed thereby, most particularly in the fi scal realm and in the fi eld of structural fi nancial 
reform.  
From this perspective, it is easy to understand how the Spanish economy was subjected to 
singular pressure. The deterioration in its public fi nances was evident not only because the 
budget defi cit had climbed to an excessive level, but also because of the rapid increase in the 
public debt ratio, despite the fact that general government debt remained substantially lower 
than that in other European economies facing similar pressures.  
But there were also other factors amplifying the vulnerability of the Spanish economy in such 
exceptional circumstances. Firstly, the dysfunctionalities of our labour market, which height-
ened the impact of the shock on employment, giving rise to a surge in the unemployment rate 
that called into question the possibility of reversing the course of public spending in the ab-
sence of reforms that would enable a signifi cant and lasting reduction in unemployment. As I 
stated before this Committee a year ago, the viability of any credible budgetary consolidation 
strategy would require the adoption of labour market reforms providing for far-reaching change 
in employment behavioural patterns.
At the same time, the Spanish economy’s high reliance on external funding made it particularly 
sensitive to any loss of confi dence blocking access to such fi nancial resources, in particular ac-
cess for credit institutions, which channel the bulk of these resources to households and fi rms.  
All these factors contributed to the contagiousness of the sovereign debt crisis and to the 
serious external funding diffi culties experienced from May to July. Had this situation continued, 
it would have jeopardised the soundness of the fi nancial system and the vital funding of the 
economy.  
In order to break the dangerous dynamic unleashed and to restore confi dence in the Spanish 
economy, which had become the main objective, it was vital to set new bearings for eco-
nomic policy through the adoption of substantial fi scal, labour and fi nancial measures.  
I previously had the opportunity to inform you of the numerous fi nancial measures pursued to 
oversee the necessary restructuring of the Spanish banking system, an essential condition for 
the sound and sustainable recovery of the economy. Allow me today to refer to the role played 
by the stress tests of the banking system in late July. These are a marker of the progress made 
in restructuring and, above all, they have provided for an exercise in transparency, allowing us 
to break the vicious circle of lack of confi dence that was building up on the basis of relatively 
unfounded assumptions and expectations. 
As you will recall, when I presented the Banco de España Annual Report for 2009 in June, I set 
out our intention to publish the stress tests of all Spanish banks and savings banks. This initia-
tive was assumed at European level by the European Council under Spain’s presidency, and 
the results of the exercise, harmonised by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, 
were published on 23 July. In Spain’s case, the stress tests covered virtually its entire fi nancial 
system and were conducted in great detail and with a high degree of transparency, providing 
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extensive information on exposure to the principal asset classes. The results showed the sys-
tem as a whole to be sound, whereby their publication undoubtedly contributed to dispelling 
the doubts over our fi nancial system. 
The fi nal piece in the far-reaching reform of the fi nancial system has been the savings bank 
legislation approved by this House. In opening up savings banks to private capital, the legisla-
tion will not only allow savings banks to move ahead without having to request assistance from 
taxpayers, but it will also enable them to meet the demanding capital requirements set under 
the new international fi nancial regulation known as Basel III.  
In the budgetary domain, the government reinforced and accelerated the implementation of 
the fi scal consolidation programme which, in compliance with Community commitments, it 
had announced in January. To this end, it approved a new raft of measures on 20 May entailing 
spending cuts of somewhat over €15 billion to be made between 2010 and 2011 (around 
1.5% of GDP), on top of the previously approved spending cuts and tax rises. The new defi cit 
target path was thus set at 9.3% of GDP in 2010, 6% in 2011, 4.4% in 2012 and 3% of GDP 
in 2013, which would steady the public debt ratio at a level slightly below 75% of GDP as from 
2012.  
Adopting a package of adjustment measures to come into force immediately, for a signifi cant 
amount, in suffi cient and specifi c detail, and affecting items as sensitive as public-sector wages, 
welfare benefi ts and public investment, gave credibility to the commitment to reduce the budget 
defi cit. Also contributing to this was the bringing forward of the fi scal adjustment targets, where-
by almost two-thirds of the adjustment envisaged by 2013 would be completed in 2011.  
Finally, having noted the failed negotiations between the trade unions and employers’ associa-
tions, the government approved a labour market reform on 16 June aimed at encouraging 
permanent hires and increasing internal fl exibility at companies, two of our labour market’s 
most serious shortcomings.  
The adoption of these measures, along with the publication of the banking stress test results, 
saw the tensions on fi nancial markets abate. There was a signifi cant reduction in funding costs 
for the Treasury and a reopening of funding channels for credit institutions.  
Yet this does not mean that the period of instability is over, as the tensions still bearing down 
on other European countries show. Accordingly, following this initial response it is essential to 
maintain the credibility earned without losing sight of the fact that for a long time we will be 
subjected to very close scrutiny, and that episodes likely to spread suspicion and a lack of 
confi dence may arise.  
This is the particular juncture we have reached and at which we are discussing this Budget. 
And these are the reasons why the recovery of the Spanish economy and employment will 
depend, more so than on past occasions, on a suitable budgetary policy mix and on its inter-
play with other economic policy tools, most particularly with supply-side and structural reform 
policies geared to improving employment-generation capacity, smoothing the switch to other 
productive activities and increasing the economy’s effectiveness and productivity. 
The cyclical juncture at which the Budget for 2011 has been drawn up is marked by the muted 
start of a phase of recovery which became discernible in the opening months of 2010 and 
which will foreseeably continue over the coming year. Nonetheless, exceptional domestic and 
external factors of uncertainty are clouding the outlook. 
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So far, the recovery is proving very subdued and dependent on temporary stimuli linked to the 
government plans supporting spending and to the possible bringing forward of consumption 
and residential investment decisions by households and fi rms in the face of the rise in indirect 
taxes on 1 July. Moreover, funding conditions remain restrictive and both the public and private 
sectors have a pressing need to restore health to their fi nancial position.  
In these circumstances it will be diffi cult for domestic demand to post the same fi gures it did 
in the fi rst half of the year. The rate of increase of household consumption, one of the most 
dynamic items in that period, will foreseeably slacken, in line with the diminished growth rate 
of earnings and the lower contribution of other sources of income, in particular those stem-
ming from general government measures. The response of consumption is expected to be 
consistent with a declining trajectory of the saving ratio, in step with the changes observed 
since the start of the year, after almost two years of successive increases in this ratio. It is very 
likely the other domestic demand components will continue to refl ect the weakness of their 
main determinants. In the case of investment in equipment, this will be due to the excess 
capacity built up during the crisis and the still-prevailing uncertainty over fi nancing conditions; 
and in that of residential investment, to the need to complete the adjustment set in train back 
in 2006.  
In contrast, net external demand is expected to be more buoyant once the high growth rates 
of imports of the previous quarters ease, rates which were linked largely to the bringing for-
ward of certain spending decisions, and exports continue on their rising course. For this to 
occur, perseverance will be needed in anchoring the cost- and price-competitiveness im-
provements obtained in recent quarters and entrenching them with genuine productivity 
gains.  
In sum, the outlook for the Spanish economy is one of gradual recovery which will take some 
time to attain the dynamism proper to an expansionary phase with suffi cient capacity to gener-
ate employment. The restoration of confi dence, the positive effects of fi scal consolidation on 
agents’ expectations and the lessening of uncertainty in the labour market, further to the re-
form under way, will need to be the essential ingredients of any sustained recovery. The private 
sector must take up the baton from the public sector in support of activity, and net external 
demand should play a predominant role.  
The success of the fi scal consolidation programme is a centrepiece of this strategy. Correcting 
the budget defi cit has become an unavoidable priority for Spanish economic policy.  
The budget outturn data currently available suggest the targets set for 2010 will be met, at 
least as far as central government conduct is concerned. On this basis, it is therefore vital to 
design a budget for 2011 that is fully consistent with meeting the budget defi cit target of 6% 
of GDP for that year. 
To ensure no deviations arise, monitoring and surveillance procedures for the budget outturn 
must be reinforced and, should deviations be detected, corrective measures must be rapidly 
applied. The availability of contingency plans designed suffi ciently in advance would contribute 
greatly to the success of these measures.  
The draft State Budget details appropriately the revenue- and spending-side measures that 
should allow compliance with the State target set. In terms of its composition, moreover, the 
draft Budget has most of the adjustment falling on public spending. And this, on past experi-
ence, raises the effectiveness of the consolidation strategy. 
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Yet the presence of risks threatening the attainment of these targets should not be under-
stated. The Budget is based on a macroeconomic scenario of signifi cant recovery which, if not 
confi rmed, might lead to a revenue path worse than projected. As I said, if this were the case, 
offsetting measures should immediately be applied.  
But perhaps the biggest risk to general government meeting its targets stems from the poten-
tial deviations that may arise at the regional and local government level. As known and reiter-
ated on many occasions, the high decentralisation of public spending in Spain means that the 
collaboration of the regional and local governments is essential for achieving budgetary stabil-
ity. At the end of this year it will be possible to make a full assessment of the consolidation drive 
made by the regional budgets, but my impression is that, as matters stand today, the meas-
ures announced by most regional and local governments far from respond to the reduction in 
public spending needed.  
I therefore believe formulas must be sought to strengthen regional and local government com-
mitment to budgetary stability and to encourage compliance. In this respect, we should not 
rule out a revision and strengthening of the national budgetary framework, in particular in the 
case of regional and local governments, a framework that resides essentially on the Budgetary 
Stability Law. Such action would be in line with the recommendations recently made by the 
European Council for all European countries in the framework of the review of governance in 
Europe. 
A key element of the Budgetary Stability Law for achieving fi scal discipline is transparency. The 
dissemination of data relating to the non-fi nancial activity of the State is abundant, detailed 
and released with a relatively small lag. This is regrettably not the case for regional or local 
governments, which curtails the ability to control their activity in time and accountability. In my 
view, these shortcomings must urgently be redressed. At a time such as the present, a lack of 
transparency may lead to a lack of market confi dence that takes the form of a further premium 
on the cost of fi nancing.  
Given the circumstances, all available instruments should be used to ensure compliance with 
the targets set. In particular, authorisation for regional and local governments to issue new 
debt should be conditional upon compliance with consolidation plans. A spending ceiling 
might even be considered for these governments, an instrument which has proven enor-
mously useful in strengthening budgetary discipline in the case of the State.  
Along the same lines, medium-term planning necessitating analysis of the structural dynam-
ics of the various public revenue and spending items and enabling those areas where the 
scope for rationalisation and adjustment are greater to be detected may prove appropriate, 
especially when adjustment measures going beyond a temporary correction of imbalances 
are required.  
In this setting, the reform of the pension system currently under discussion is especially impor-
tant. Indeed, it goes beyond the major goal of ensuring the long-term sustainability of our 
pensions system in the face of the challenge of population ageing. This reform may also have 
signifi cant and benefi cial short-term effects on the credibility of the authorities’ commitment to 
budgetary discipline and the ability to see through far-reaching structural reforms and favour-
ably infl uence the risk premia on public debt.  
The promptness and ambitiousness of the reform are essential. A suitable combination of 
changes in certain parameters of the system, raising the legal retirement age, the minimum 
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number of years necessary to qualify for a pension and the period over which the pension is 
calculated would help ease substantially the pressure on future public spending on pensions 
and resolve one of the Spanish economy’s major outstanding problems.  
Fiscal consolidation is an essential condition for ensuring future economic growth. The ef-
fort will no doubt be rewarded because it will place the Spanish economy in a sounder 
position to anchor the recovery. Its long-term effects will in any event prove more forceful if 
accompanied by structural reforms that raise the economy’s growth potential. The ele-
ments interconnecting both policies are on an enormous scale: potential growth infl uences 
the sustainability of public fi nances, while an appropriate distribution of adjustment efforts 
across the various spending and revenue items is conducive to activity and has expansion-
ary effects on output and employment. Harnessing these links is particularly important for 
absorbing high unemployment and correcting the imbalances built up during the boom 
years.  
Economic policy action geared to strengthening growth foundations is of vital importance, 
particularly the reforms promoting job creation. Such action makes possible the achievement 
of gains in competitiveness and enhances the economy’s long-term effi ciency and productiv-
ity. And it is also essential for boosting the external sector and providing for the rapid realloca-
tion of resources towards potentially dynamic goods and services branches. 
As I have reiterated on many occasions, labour market reform is pivotal here. Indeed, signifi -
cant progress has been made with the recent approval of the legislation on urgent labour 
market reform measures. Among the changes made that may contribute to improving the 
functioning of our labour market, I feel it is important to stress the greater possibilities available 
to fi rms to adjust working and wage conditions to the changes arising in demand or in supply-
side innovations, thereby limiting the impact of these shocks on employment. It is now for 
employers and employees to take full advantage of the new opportunities provided by labour 
reform so that the necessary gains in competitiveness can be had as soon as possible, swift-
ly ushering in a new phase of economic dynamism and job creation. Slowness in harnessing 
the internal fl exibility offered by the reform would but hamper recovery and delay the genera-
tion of new jobs.
It is important to take advantage of the conditions in place so that the wage moderation begun 
in the fi rst half of the year may take root in the coming quarters, and so that ailing companies 
may maintain employment and ensure their survival by drawing on the new avenues of fl exibil-
ity offered to them, through negotiations with their workers. The austerity measures adopted 
in the public sector, which include wage cuts, will help bring about the adjustments the private 
sector needs to entrench its competitiveness. On top of wage restraint in those companies 
that need it to restore competitiveness, there should be genuine productivity gains based on 
greater effi ciency, since so far their expansionary behaviour chiefl y refl ects the severity of the 
employment adjustment.
A further key ingredient to ensure gains in structural competitiveness is the continuation of 
the current low-infl ation scenario once the recovery fi rms. The return of the core infl ation rate 
to its low level before the VAT rise, once the base effects are stripped out in the second half 
of next year, would be a good indicator that cost- and price-setting processes are moving in 
the right direction and are capable of surviving comfortably within an area of price stability. 
The absence of indexation clauses in wage bargaining for 2011, as stipulated in the agree-
ment in force, will help prevent the rise in VAT from exerting second-round and infl ation-iner-
tia effects. This experience is another example of the advantages to be had from abandoning 
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indexation clauses, which are no more than a legacy of infl ationary habits from a past fi rmly 
behind us, but whose continuing use has been a source of problems, as the Banco de Es-
paña has reiterated. 
Improving our economy’s productivity in the medium and long run will require seeing through 
other, deeper structural reforms, including most notably sectoral liberalisation, the rationalisa-
tion of the public sector’s role in economic activity and improvements to the education system. 
These are reforms whose introduction needs time and whose effects will be deployed over a 
lengthy period; but the resolve to adopt them also has positive effects in the short run by im-
proving expectations about our economy’s economic growth, which is particularly welcome in 
these testing times. 
